Abdullah also seemed to possess the political acumen necessary to adjust to the changing needs and increased political awareness of the Saudi populace, as well as to the shifting political realities in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Abdullah didn’t officially ascend until 2005, but he had been the de facto king since 1995, when his predecessor and half-brother Fahd’s health started failing. It was Abdullah who had to steady the ship during the tumultuous aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States and subsequent terrorist attacks inside the kingdom in 2003 and 2004.
The specter of terrorism not only forced some to question the foundation of Saudi Arabia’s “special” relationship with the US, but also posed a serious threat to the stability of the regime by challenging its Islamic bona fides on which its entire claim to legitimacy rests.
Although it was the late Interior Minister Naif Bin Abdulaziz and his successor who devised the kingdom’s multi-pronged counter-terrorism strategy — part security operation, part public awareness campaign — that largely contained the threat from al Qaeda, Abdullah’s resoluteness and assurances to Saudis and the international community should not be underestimated.
Foreign policy initiatives
Many might remember Abdullah for his foreign policy initiatives, including his plan for comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors — adopted first by the Arab League in 2002 and then again 2007 — or his efforts to foster interfaith understanding by sponsoring international forums aimed at bringing together followers of various religions to stress their shared values, as his meeting with Pope Benedict in 2009 illustrated.
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While there is little doubt that the Syrian crisis, the aftermath of the Arab Spring and nuclear negotiations with Iran have created what seemed at times to be a serious rift in Saudi-U.S. relations, it is highly debatable that it was King Abdullah alone whose views on these issues differed from those of the U.S.
What for his successor?
These still-unresolved crises and impasses will likely continue to be sticking points under King Salman.
King Salman will likely shuffle some top government positions around, and his style might be a little different than Abdullah’s. At some point, he will likely try to put his own stamp on the throne. That, however, is not likely to be by changing the nature of Saudi-U.S. relations in any fundamental way.
Some have argued that the secret to the longevity of the Saudi royal family is its careful attention to three constants: Islam, oil and its relations with the U.S. Salman is not likely to lose sight of that. Under Salman, bilateral relations with the U.S. will likely continue to be “special.”
